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Disclaimer 
This document reports on the work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and has received 
only limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the institute, 
its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
 
Abstract 
This document describes the research approach, methodology and work plan of the Centre of Expertise on 
Population and Migration that was established in 2016 as a collaboration been IIASA (International Institute  
for Applied Systems Analysis) and JRC (Joint Research Centre of the European Commission). This collaboration 
is scheduled for three years and each side provides the funding of five post-doctoral researchers.  
Team members will be jointly supervised and be stationed in Ispra and at IIASA with strong interactions. 
The new Centre will take a multi-dimensional demographic approach to assess the consequences of alternative 
future population and migration trends in Europe as well as in the main regions of origin for migration into 
Europe. The Centre will study push and pull factors, different kinds of migration streams as well as the impact 
of migration flows for Europe in terms of population aging and the productivity of Europe’s labor force over the 
coming decades. This will be done in terms of macro-level modelling including population scenarios by age, sex, 
level of education and labor force participation for all EU member states as well as micro-simulation models 
with more characteristics in order to study the integration of migrants.   Scenarios by age, sex and level of 
education will also be done for potential sending countries in Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe and combined 
with aspects of socio-economic and environmental change following the narratives of the SSPs (Shared Socio-
economic Pathways) to assess possible future push factors. Special attention is given to the possible impacts of 
climate change on migration. 
The main output documents will be a set of updated population scenarios by age, sex and level of education 
following the approach of the OUP volume “World Population and 4uman Capital in the 21st Century”  
(Lutz et al. 2014) to be produced by the end of 2017 and a scientific book with the main conclusion  
concerning alternative migration and integration scenarios to be finalized in late 2018 to serve as input  
for the policy planning of the new incoming European Commission. In addition the publication of a number  
of peer-reviewed scientific journal articles is foreseen. 
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1. Background 
During the first half of 2016 the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission and the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) agreed to form a partnership for the establishment of a joint 
"Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration". On 20 June, policymakers, analysts, and researchers from 
around Europe came together in Brussels to launch the new Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration,  
a joint institution between IIASA and the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC). The event was 
opened by Chair: Vladimír Šucha, Director-General, Directorate-General Joint Research Centre, European 
Commission; Kristalina Georgieva, Vice-President of the European Commission, Budget and Human Resources, 
European Commission; Christos Stylianides, Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, 
European Commission; Tibor Navracsics, Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, European 
Commission; Peter Diez, Deputy Director Migration Policy, Ministry of Security and Justice , The Netherlands.  
A keynote speech was delivered by Demetrios G. Papademetriou, President of the Migration Policy Institute 
(MPI) Europe, and substantive introductions to the work of the Centre of Expertise were done by Delilah  
Al Khudhairy (JRC), Mariana Kotzeva (Eurostat) and Wolfgang Lutz and Anne Goujon (both IIASA). 
The new Centre was tasked to provide multi-dimensional assessments of future population trends in Europe  
as well as in the main regions of origin for migration into Europe. The Centre will study push and pull factors, 
different kinds of migration streams as well as the impact of migration flows for Europe in terms of population 
aging and the productivity of Europe’s labor force over the coming decades. 
This collaborative effort has been designed to fill a research gap because existing research in the EU is 
insufficient to assess the longer term implications of migration- and population- related challenges 
comprehensively. The 2015 “Ageing Report” of the European Commission provides an assessment of the 
economic and budgetary challenges associated with demographic change in the 28 member States of the EU 
up to 2060 (European Commission 2015). Those projections, however, are only based on one scenario 
assuming relatively moderate migration into Europe. In addition, Eurostat produces regularly national level 
population projections for all EU member States by age and sex and in irregular intervals regional projections at 
the NUTS2 level. However, forecasts by level of education and labor force participation or projections for 
possible countries of origin of migrants are not available. There is also a gap in studying alternative migration 
policy scenarios differentiated by education levels of migrants or countries of origin. 
Outside Europe, the US Census Bureau produces population projections for all countries in the world in the 
form of a single scenario by age and sex without alternative migration assumptions. The UN Population Division 
produces probabilistic population projections for all countries in the world by age and sex up to 2100.  
It also publishes high and low fertility scenarios, but no scenarios based on alternative migration assumptions.  
The Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (a collaboration of IIASA, ÖAW and WU) 
has recently produced a set of global population scenarios to 2100 by age, sex and level of education for all 
countries in the world. These scenarios follow the narratives of the SSPs (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) 
which have been defined by a consortium of global environmental change research groups. 
This methodological document is divided into four additional sections. The next section presents both the 
macro and micro models of population projections that will be created in the next three years of the research 
project. The following section summarizes knowledges developed at IIASA and elsewhere regarding the push 
factors that drive population migration in the global context and defines how changes will be made to existing 
models to address the potential impact of changes in narratives more specific to African and West-Asian 
countries. The fourth section briefly illustrates how all these new findings to be generated can be integrated to 
help develop new alternative migration scenarios for Europe in the context of population ageing.  Finally, the 
last section presents the milestones and time schedule of the main tasks to be accomplished during the next 
three years. 
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2. Pull factors: Study of demographic trends in the EU 
2.1 Population scenarios (macro-simulation) for the EU member states by age, sex,  
level of education and labor force participation to 2060 
The definition of demography applied in this project will not only include age and sex structures of populations 
but also their changing compositions by level of education, labor force participation, and other dimensions,  
as appropriate. In order to embed the population outlook into the context of political, social and economic 
development, it will also incorporate such changes in potential regions of origin as a driver of future migration.  
For the EU member states the medium (most likely) scenario will be identical, in terms of population size and 
age structure, to that produced by Eurostat during the first quarter of 2017. This will assure full consistency of 
the projected age and sex structure resulting from this project with the population projections used in other 
parts of the European Commission and, in particular, by the Working Group on Ageing. But the projections to 
be produced here will go in several ways beyond what Eurostat or national statistical offices routinely produce: 
There will be a multitude of different scenarios based on alternative assumptions on future migration, fertility, 
mortality, and education and the projected populations will be stratified by more characteristics than the 
conventional age and sex only. In the first part, applying macro-simulations – which are a multi-dimensional 
generalization of the conventional cohort component model – the population will be also stratified by level  
of highest educational attainment with different age- and sex-specific fertility, mortality and migration rates  
for people with different levels of educational attainment. Still in the context of macro-simulation’s, these 3-D 
(by age, sex and level of education) scenarios will be expanded into 4-D scenarios by superimposing matrices  
of age-, sex- and education-specific labor force participation rates. This 4th dimension, however, will only be 
added in the form of applying a prevalence matrix (Sullivan method) and not assume differential demographic 
rates by labor force participation status because of strong interactions between fertility, health, and labor force 
participation. In a second part, that will be described in the following section, tools of microsimulation will be 
used to dynamically project the population by a larger number of further characteristics that are considered 
relevant. 
Because this approach of multi-dimensional population modelling is not yet widely known and applied,  
we will start with some more general considerations about the advantages of applying this model1. 
Focus on human capital: The rationale of population projections by age, sex and level of education 
In general, human beings have many observable and measurable characteristics that distinguish one individual 
from another as well as one sub-group of a population from another. In demography the sex/gender of a 
person is considered a most fundamental characteristic because it is essential for studying the process of 
reproduction. Other demographic processes such as mortality and migration also show significant variation by 
sex/gender. Age is another key characteristic of people because it is the main driver of biological maturation in 
early ages and matters for social institutions such as school attendance, labor force entry and retirement. 
There are also distinct variations in fertility, mortality and migration intensities with age. 
But individuals differ in many other measurable characteristics than age and sex. Various biological, social  
and economic characteristics such as urban/rural place of residence, marital status, educational attainment 
level, race, migration status, employment status, income group, and health/disability status are measurable 
characteristics of people that demographers have taken into account. It has been argued that among these, 
educational attainment level is the single most important source of observable population heterogeneity  
that should be routinely added to population analyzes based on three criteria (Wolfgang Lutz et al. 1998;  
Wolfgang Lutz 2010), 2): (a) its explicit consideration is feasible in terms of available data and methodology; (b) 
it matters significantly in terms of altering population dynamics; and (c) it is of interest in its own right in terms 
of its social and economic implications. The following sections will address these criteria separately.  
Such integration of education can also be interpreted as adding a “quality” dimension to the consideration  
of population numbers.  
                                                                                                                         
1 this section heavily draws on (Wolfgang Lutz and KC 2011) 
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Human capital is usually defined to encompass both the education and health of people. While health is an 
important prerequisite for effectively attending school at young age and matters for economic productivity  
at adult age, here we will focus primarily on education because it can be measured more consistently across 
countries and because an exciting new field of analysis has recently opened in the field of demographic 
education modelling. 
When measuring education, it is important to conceptually distinguish between education flows and stocks. 
The flows refer to the process of education, to schooling, or more generally the production of human capital 
which may consist of formal and informal education. This process of education is the central focus of 
pedagogics and education science where the usual statistical indicators are school enrolment rates, student-
teacher ratios, drop-out rates and repetition rates. Human capital refers to the stock of educated adult people 
which is the result of past education flows for younger adults in the more recent past and for older ones quite 
some decades ago. This stock is usually measured in terms of the quantity of formal education (highest level of 
attainment or mean years of schooling) but the quality dimension (the skills people actually have) and content 
or direction of education also matter. Content matters more for higher education than for basic education 
where the main aim is the acquisition of literacy skills and basic numeracy. The quantity of formal education is 
often measured by the mean years of schooling of the adult population above either the age of 15 or 25. This 
has the advantage of capturing the entire human capital of a population at one point in time in one single 
number (or two when one distinguishes between men and women). But there is much to be gained from 
decomposing this highly aggregate indicator into the full distribution of educational attainment categories (and 
capturing the inequality in education) and into different age groups and hence capturing inter-cohort changes 
that drive many of the consequences of improving human capital on society and economy. 
Consistent time series data on educational attainment that are comparable across a large number of countries 
are difficult to obtain. Theoretically, the data by age, sex and level of education should be available from the 
censuses and many representative surveys. In practice, these data are almost impossible to compare across 
countries and over time because of differing definitions of education categories despite UNESCO’s significant 
efforts to standardize classifications in the form of the ISCED categories. This has led several groups of 
scientists, who needed consistent times series of human capital data for the analysis of the returns to 
education to try to estimate the information indirectly (Barro and Lee 2001; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Cohen 
and Soto 2007; de la Fuente and Doménech 2006; Wolfgang Lutz et al. 2007). In most cases this was done by 
combining information from times series of school enrolment rates with the existing fragmentary information 
on attainment while at the same time trying to iron out national peculiarities. Demographic multi-state models 
offer an alternative approach which can deal with age and sex-specific reconstructions and projections of 
human capital in a unified framework that also considers educational mortality and fertility differentials. 
The methods of multi-state population dynamics are a generalization of the conventional cohort-component 
method of population projection which only stratifies populations by age and sex. In the multi-state model  
(the approach is also known under the name of multi-dimensional mathematical demography) additional 
dimensions are being added that sub-divide the population into different states which all have their specific 
fertility, mortality and migration patterns. The methodology was developed during the 1970s in and around 
IIASA (Keyfitz 1985; Land and Rogers 1982) originating from a geographic perspective in which the states were 
defined to be regions of a country with the populations interacting through internal migration. Later this 
concept was generalized and states were defined to mean marital statuses as well as health states (such as 
disabled and non-disabled) (Manton et al. 1997; Rogers and Belanger 1989) or different types of households (Yi 
et al. 1998). 
Multi-state methods are particularly appropriate for modelling changes in educational attainment. The model 
is simplified by the fact that transitions from one state to another only go in one direction (people only move 
up to higher attainment categories) and are concentrated at younger ages. Furthermore, fertility and mortality 
levels tend to vary greatly and systematically by level of education and hence the explicit consideration makes 
a crucial difference (discussed below). 
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In applying these methods for projecting backward (reconstruction) or forward into the future one has to have 
at least one data point for which the size and structure of the population by age, sex and level of educational 
attainment is available empirically. The empirical data set for each country used here (KC et al. 2010; Wolfgang 
Lutz et al. 2007) refers to dates around the year 2000. Given this information the basic idea of projecting is 
straightforward: Assuming that the educational attainment of a person remains invariant after a certain age, 
one can derive, e.g., the proportion of women without any formal education aged 50-54 in 2005 directly from 
the proportion of women without any formal education aged 45-49 in 2000 and vice versa considering the 
education specific mortality and migration rates between those ages. One has to make further adjustments for 
the fact that higher education levels can still change after age 15 and fertility, mortality and migration vary by 
level of education.  
 
  
  
Figure 1. Population of Croatia by age and sex and education level for 1970, 1990, 2010 and projected for 2030. 
Figure 1 illustrates this dynamic with the example of Croatia, the EUs youngest member, for the period 1970 to 
2030. Red shows the number of men and women without any formal education. They are still very numerous 
among the elderly female population in 1970. Orange indicates persons with some primary education, light 
blue completed junior secondary and dark blue completed tertiary education. The figure also shows that today 
the younger cohorts are much better educated than the older ones. Reconstructing the education structure for 
the year 1970 follows the above-described procedure along cohort lines: those aged 50-54 in 2000 were aged 
20-24 in 1970. The same procedure is applied for forecasting where the cohort aged 20-24 in 2010 will be aged 
40-44 in 2030 and will essentially maintain its proportions with primary and secondary education. Only the 
tertiary category may still be joined by some after the age of 20-24. This figure also illustrates that much of the 
future improvement in the educational attainment of the adult population is already embedded in today’s 
education structure. Future changes in school enrolment rates will only make a difference for younger cohorts. 
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This three dimensional population model by age, sex and level of education will be calculated for all countries 
of the world. Almost universally, the children of more educated women have lower mortality rates. A great 
deal of research has focused on substantiating the independent and causal relationship between maternal 
schooling and child health (Caldwell 1979; Fuchs et al. 2010). Reviews of surveys and census data from 
developing countries (Hobcraft et al. 1984; Mensch et al. 1985) and econometric analyzes of cross-country 
macro-data confirmed women’s education as the most significant determinant of child mortality, where 
estimates show that each additional year of schooling is associated with a 5%-7% reduction in child death 
(Mensch et al. 1985; Schultz 1993). 
A systematic assessment for a large number of developing countries (using recent DHS micro level data) finds 
that, almost universally, mothers’ education is more important for child survival than household income and 
wealth. This finding has significant implications for setting policy priorities because it makes a big difference 
whether emphasis is put primarily on girl’s education or household income generation. 
In terms of fertility – measured as the number of live births per woman – the educational differentials are 
equality pervasive. While fertility rates have seen significant declines in most of Asia and Latin America, in  
Sub-Saharan Africa they are still at an average of five children per woman with some individual countries  
such as Niger as high as seven children. In virtually every developing society more educated women have lower 
fertility than less educated ones. A rather extreme case is Ethiopia, where according to the DHS uneducated 
women have on average more than six children, while those with secondary education have two children on 
average. More educated women have lower desired family sizes because they face higher opportunity costs 
and tend to put more emphasis on the “quality” of children (Becker 1991). The empirical data show that better 
educated women consistently want fewer children, have greater autonomy in reproductive decision-making, 
more knowledge about and access to contraception and use it more effectively, and are more motivated to use 
contraception because of higher opportunity costs of unintended childbearing (Bongaarts 2010; Cleland and 
Rodriguez 1988). 
Education matters greatly for almost every aspect of progress in human development. The empowering 
function of education is considered a major goal in its own right. The Human Development Index, one of the 
most widely used indicators of desirable social and economic progress, consists of three components, one 
measuring progress in education itself and the two others capturing progress in health and material wellbeing. 
There is reason to assume that these latter two aspects are to some extent driven by progress in the education 
of the population and that indeed human capital may be viewed as the root cause of human development 
(Wolfgang Lutz 2009a). The human capital data that are differentiated by age and sex helped to shed some 
light on this assertion. 
In economics it has been assumed for a long time that education has an important positive effect not only on 
individual earnings but also on aggregate-level economic growth. While the empirical evidence is unambiguous 
for individual-level earnings, the statistical evidence for economic growth has been rather weak until recently. 
The reasons for this unsatisfactory situation can be found in the lack of precision of the education data used 
and more specifically in the lack of explicitly considering the age structure of human capital (Benhabib and 
Spiegel 1994; Cohen and Soto 2007; de la Fuente and Doménech 2006; W. Lutz et al. 2008). As can be seen 
from the example of Croatia in Figure 1, the most frequently used indicator of human capital in economic 
growth regressions – the mean years of schooling of the entire adult population above the age of 25 – averages 
over age cohorts with very different levels of education, including the highly educated young cohorts as well  
as the poorly educated older ones. In recent analyzes that explicitly consider the age structure of human 
capital, it could be shown that economic growth is fastest when the better educated young cohorts enter 
young adulthood. This pattern is most clearly visible for the Asian tiger states where the inter-cohort 
improvements in education were dramatic. At the global level, the age-specific human capital indicators 
statistically confirm the key role of human capital for economic growth unambiguously2.
                                                                                                                         
2 (W. Lutz et al. 2008) 
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Education is also one of the most important determinants of adult health and mortality. Large numbers of 
studies have established significant education gradients in mortality in different parts of the world despite 
marked contextual differences (KC and Lentzner 2010; Mackenbach et al. 1999). Even more dramatic are the 
education differentials with respect to disability at older ages. A recent global level study on the basis of the 
World Health Survey found that almost universally, more educated men and women at a given age have a 
much lower level of self-reported disability (ADL – limitations in activities of daily living) than the less educated 
(KC and Lentzner 2010). Viewing this fact together with the above-described education projections entirely 
changes our outlook on the prevalence of disability in the future. If the focus is only on age and sex, then the 
observed pattern of increased disability at higher ages, together with the projection that there will be more 
elderly in the future, results in quite dramatic forecasts of future numbers of persons with severe disabilities. If 
education is also factored in, the picture looks less dramatic. In most countries of the world the elderly of the 
future will be better educated than the elderly of today. Assuming that the more educated at any age have 
significantly lower disability rates, this improving education factor may partly or even fully compensate for the 
aging factor (KC and Lentzner 2010; Wolfgang Lutz 2009b). But since there are still many unknowns, these 
interactions between education and health are an important field for more research. 
Education matters significantly for many further issues than disability, longevity and economic wellbeing. At 
the individual level more educated people are doing better along almost any dimension ranging from mental 
health to the ability to recover from shock to lower unemployment. At the aggregate level systems of 
governance and democracy have been shown to be closely related to a society’s level of education. It has been 
shown that the age structure of human capital and in particular the time when large cohorts of better 
educated men and women enter the young adult ages play a key role in the transitions of societies into modern 
democracies (Wolfgang Lutz et al. 2010). Large cohorts of young adults (sometimes called the “youth bulge”) 
who are also better educated but cannot match their higher aspirations with the realities under an oppressive 
regime, present a major force towards change or migration out from the country. This picture fits well to the 
recent events in the Arab world. 
Methods and Data for the macro-level projections 
Over the past decades, IIASA has developed a methodology to project multi-dimensional population dynamics. 
By multi-dimensional we mean population projections that go beyond age and sex, the two dimensions of 
population projections realized using the traditional cohort-component approach. IIASA has since published 
several sets of scenarios projecting the population for all countries in the world to 2100 by age, sex and 
education (3D model). The latest round of projections produced by IIASA following this methodology project 
the population by age and sex and six education categories for 195 countries of the world. (Wolfgang Lutz et al. 
2014). 
As described above, there are at least two important reasons to use this multi-dimensional methodology rather 
than the traditional cohort-component method which stratifies populations only by age and sex. First, adding 
additional dimensions such as education should improve the accuracy of the demographic projections since 
education is perhaps the most important determinant of the components of population changes: fertility, 
mortality and migration. A projection that takes into account the differentials in fertility, mortality and 
migration is likely to better project the future number of births, deaths or migrants since it will explicitly 
account for the change in the population composition by education level. The other main reasons to use multi-
dimensional projections is that adding the education dimension to population projections provides much more 
useful results to guide future policies because education is a main determinant to many socio-economic 
behaviors. Thus, the composition of the population by education level will also affect the global labor force 
participation rate or the productivity of the labor force and, ultimately, the economic growth rate. More 
recently, the methodology was expanded by Loichinger (Loichinger 2015) to add a fourth dimension, the labor 
force participation by age, sex and education. 
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While for the rest of the world this project with carry out population scenarios by age, sex, and level of 
education following the SSP narratives (see description in section 3 below) for the EU member states labor 
force participation will be added as a fourth dimension on the macro level.  The base line data for all 28 EU 
members’ states will come from Eurostat and the European Labor Force Surveys (LFS).  
Adding labor force participation to the age, sex and education projections is realized in two additional sub-
steps. The first sub-step necessitates the projection for each country of the future participation rates by age, 
sex and education level. Multiplying the projected labor force participation rates by age, sex and education 
level to the corresponding projected population will yield the projected labor force projection. This is a 
procedure called derived projections. Using this methodology, labor force status cannot be used as a 
determinant of the demographic components of population changes.  
The difficulty here is to make plausible assumptions on the future trends in labor force participation rates. This 
will be achieved through an analysis of past trends in age, sex and education specific trends to support 
assumptions on future evolution of the rates. The data on past labor force participation trends will be 
extracted from cross-sectional files of the European labor force survey (EU-LFS). This survey provides 
comparable information across time and space since the concepts, definitions and classifications employed are 
harmonized by Eurostat. The education variable will be the highest education level completed (HATLEVID) 
which is available in the data set since 1992. For each country, past participation rates by age, sex and 
education level will be computed by dividing the active population (employed and unemployed) by the total 
population. The youngest age group will be 15-19 and the open age group will be 65+.  
Then, scenarios will be built by making assumption on future trends. It is planned to have at least three 
scenarios. The first one, the constant scenario, will be based on the most recent observations (2014) and will 
maintain constant these observed rates during the entire projection period. The second one, the recent trend 
scenario, will be based on an extrapolation of the recent observed changes in participation rates by age, sex 
and education. This scenario will thus take into account the increasing participation rates of younger female 
cohorts compared to older ones observed in many European countries resulting from greater gender equality. 
It can also take into account the changes in the age at retirement observed in some countries or delayed entry 
into the labor force. It is important to carefully select the observation period to take into account specific 
period effect due to the cyclical nature of the economy. The third scenario will model the participation rates 
towards a given distribution. Called the benchmark scenario, it will assume that all countries age, sex and 
participation rates will converge towards the 2014 observed rates in the more advanced economy. As stated by 
Loichinger (2015) , this benchmark scenario illustrates what can be achieved in other countries in case they 
follow this example. 
Based on the alternative population scenarios by age, sex and level of education that were recently produced 
by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (a collaboration of IIASA, VID/ÖAW and 
WU), a set of 4-dimensional projections was produced for all EU countries that added labor force participation 
by age, sex and education as an additional dimension. These calculations, however, did not yet consider 
alternative migration scenarios but only focused on changes in the economic dependency ratio (the proportion 
of non-working people to people in the labor force), as a consequence of three different scenarios of future 
labor force participation: 1. keeping the current pattern of age-specific participation rates constant (constant 
scenario), 2. accounting for the fact that young cohorts (in particular women) work in higher proportions than 
older ones and likely will continue to do so when they become older (cohort scenario) and 3. under the 
assumption that the pattern in all European countries over the next two decades moves to that currently 
observed in Sweden (benchmark scenario). 
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The dotted lines in the below figure give the scenarios that are only based on the age- and sex-specific labor 
force participation rates. The solid lines show those that, in addition, consider the education structure. Since 
more educated women (and to a lesser extent also men) have higher labor force participation rates and also 
tend to retire significantly later and in all European countries the younger cohorts are better educated than the 
older ones, this will result in higher labor force participation, as the better educated cohorts move up the age 
pyramid (a process called “demographic metabolism”). These scenarios only assume modest future migration 
into Europe.  
The project will enrich this sort of analysis through a number of different migration scenarios varying the 
volume, education level and labor force participation rates of migrants at their time of arrival. In other words, 
migrants will be allocated to the states of in the labor force or not in the labor force at the time of their arrival 
since migrant status in not a separate dimension in this four-dimensional macro analysis. In the micro-
simulation allowing for much higher dimensionality not only migrant status but also duration of stay in the 
country will be explicitly considered variables linked to labor force participation. 
 
Figure 2: Trend in the economic dependency ratio in the EU27 according to different scenarios of future age-, sex-  
and education-specific labor force participation rates. Source: Loichinger 2015
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2.2 Microsimulation models based on the EU-LFS for projections of further relevant 
population characteristics  
Macro level population projection models based on multistate methodology will be used in a different phase  
of the project to forecast the EU-28 population by age, sex, education level and labor force participation. 
Multistate projections have been extensively used in the past by national statistics agency and Eurostat alike  
to forecast population by age, sex and some other dimensions.  In addition, the CEPAM is aiming to investigate 
the impact of other dimensions, such as immigrant status, duration of residence in the host country, country  
of birth, language or religion. These additional dimensions prove to be important as immigration streams 
impact populations demographically, socio-economically, spatially, and culturally. Furthermore, demographic 
behaviors and socio-economic outcomes of immigrants differ from natives and in a context where the 
immigrant population is growing fast, it becomes more and more important to account for these differentials.  
The objective here is, thus, to project as many characteristics of the population as possible, so as to generate 
relevant results guiding policy makers in their decisions with respect to immigration policy, social cohesion, 
labor market needs and changes, poverty and inequalities, as well as education and language skills formation 
needs.The simultaneous projection of several dimensions in a multistate model, however, entails technical 
challenges that prove difficult to overcome as the model state-space (matrix size) grows exponentially to 
include all possible combinations of attribute values. We have, thus, to change the methodological paradigm 
from multistate to microsimulation.  
Microsimulation is a powerful tool that can be used to make population projections when the number of 
dimensions becomes large. There is also an emerging consensus about the usefulness of this type of models  
for population projections in general. We therefore propose to develop a new European microsimulation 
model to project the population of the EC-28 countries by age, sex, immigrant status, region of birth, education 
status, labor force participation as core dimensions. In countries with sufficient and reliable data other 
dimensions, such as knowledge of languages or religious denomination, may be added.  
This part of this methodological document is sub-divided in three sections. In the first section, the structure  
of the proposed microsimulation model is presented in general terms. In the second section, special attention 
is given to the content of the European Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) which is proposed as the main data source 
and the base population of the model. Finally, the third section defines the main events governing  
state transitions in the model and discusses the methods used to estimate relevant parameters.  
1 - General structure of the model 
We propose to develop a dynamic, continuous time, case- and event-based, open, stochastic (Monte Carlo) 
and spatial microsimulation projection model of the EU-28 population using the Modgen3 programming 
language. Its point of departure will be 2015 and its starting population will be based on a pooled 2014-2015 
EU-LFS microdata file to increase the sample size. Its general structure will be similar to the structure of the 
LSD-C model4 developed for projecting the Canadian population. For the purpose of this methodological report, 
we will refer to the proposed model using the name CEPAM-EU. 
CEPAM-EU will be case-based, meaning that each individual will be simulated separately from other individuals 
and that no interactions between individuals will be allowed (with the exception of interactions between 
mother and children). The model will also be dynamic and in continuous time, meaning that characteristics of 
individuals are modified continuously in “real time”, in contrast to discrete-time models where characteristics 
are changed within predefined time units (typically one year). This allows for an easier treatment of competing 
risks.  
                                                                                                                         
3 Modgen is a meta language of C++ developed and maintained by Statistics Canada. Modgen and its documentation may be downloaded for free on 
Statistics Canada’s website. Modgen models are coded and implemented in the Microsoft Visual Studio software suite. Once compiled, a Modgen 
model takes the form of a stand-alone executable file (.exe) that allows manipulation of the model through a graphical user interface. From this 
interface the user is able modify simulation parameters and create customized scenarios. 
4 The Canadian model (LSD-C for Laboratoire de simulation démographique-Canada) has been developed at the Institut national de la recherche 
scientifique – Centre Urbanisation Culture Société in Montréal. From the beginning, this Canadian model was meant to be used as a template from 
which other national models could be created so as to allow international comparisons.  
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The CEPAM-EU model will simultaneously projects demographic (age, sex, place of residence, immigrant  
status), ethnocultural (country of birth, and where possible other variables such as language or religion) and 
socioeconomic (education, labor force participation, unemployment and hours worked) characteristics  
of the EU-28 population. It will allow for changes in individual characteristics over the life course as well as  
for intergenerational transfers of some characteristics of the mother to the child born. 
Individuals from the base population will be simulated one by one and their characteristics will be modified 
through scheduled events whose timing will be determined by the values of their specific input parameters  
at any given time during the projection period. The parameters will themselves be derived from a variety  
of sources and methods.  
The occurrence of each event will depend on a selection of individual characteristics which can vary from  
one type of event to the other, or between countries. Interregional mobility, for example, can vary according  
to age, sex, place of residence, language skills, immigrant status and country of birth, education and labor force 
participation; while fertility can vary with age, religion, immigrant status and education. It is important  
to stress that microsimulation is a flexible methodology allowing the use of different equations and risk  
models for the same event according to an individual’s region or country of residence. Thus, in the case  
of the fertility example, fertility differentials by religious affiliation can be added only where this information  
is available.   
The conceptualisation of the model events and the derivation of the corresponding parameters are described 
below in the last section. The following section addresses the issue of the base population. 
2 - The EU-LFS and the base population 
The base population is a representation of the population at a given time and is used as a starting point in  
a simulation. A micro database representative of the starting population along all (or most) of its relevant 
characteristics is the corner stone of any dynamic microsimulation model. In a country-specific project, the 
base population will usually be extracted from a national census, a population register or another large survey. 
Finding such a database covering all EC-28 countries with harmonized content for all the dimensions was one 
of the challenges of the present project. Fortunately, the EU-LFS provides an adequate survey base for the 
starting population, and its advantages and disadvantages will be discussed below. 
A base population is usually constructed by recoding and extracting relevant variables from a large survey or a 
national census. It the context of this project, we would have to rely on a survey that ideally covered all needed 
variables5 for all EU-28 countries in a harmonized way. The EU-LFS appears to meet these criteria. It has the 
advantage of providing several years of consistent and harmonized data for all countries6 and has a large 
sample size. A typical yearly data file contains a total of total of 4.7 million cases, but the coverage varies 
between countries.  In 2012, Iceland with near 13 000 cases had the smallest sample size while Italy with 607 
000 cases was the largest. Two years of data can be pooled to increase the sample size, improve estimations 
and reduce the Monte Carlo error. The historical data may also be used to follow trends and determine if 
parameters are stable or more likely to change over time. The EU-LFS obviously contains detailed data on labor 
and employment history (including duration in current LF status), but also several individual characteristics 
necessary to fulfil the project objectives: age, sex, country of residence, nationality, country of birth, year and 
age at immigration (in the country of residence), years of education and year of completion of highest 
education level, education of parents and household structure which can be used to estimate fertility 
differentials using the own-children method.  
As comprehensive as it may be, the EU-LFS does not include all of the suggested dimensions included  
in this proposal, such as religious affiliation or language skills7. Those characteristics will have to be imputed in 
the base population based on another data sources (ESS). This shortcoming, however, is of relatively minor 
importance compared to the substantial advantages of using the EU-LFS as the base population. 
                                                                                                                         
5 It is also possible to impute characteristics to the cases in the base population using information from other surveys,  
but direct observations are preferable. 
6 The number of years of available data varies by country; the last country to enter the EU-LFS is Malta in 2009. 
7 The 2008 and 2014 ad hoc modules on the labor market situation of migrants and their immediate descendants does include  
a question on the need to improve host country language to get appropriate job.  
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3 - Main components of the model 
In general, model parameters will be estimated using logistic regressions or proportional hazard modeling. 
Several data sources will be used for analysis: EU-LFS, censuses, vital statistics, European Social Surveys, 
Eurobarometers, Population Health Surveys and other relevant sources. The following paragraphs briefly 
discuss data sources and estimation procedures of model parameters. It currently relies extensively on the EU-
LFS data as the exploration of other possible sources is yet to be completed.  
Mortality: Projected survivorship proportions by age, sex, country and education level estimated for the macro 
model can be directly used in the microsimulation model. In addition, it might be possible to add a parameter 
to take into account the healthy immigrant effect, but at this point it is not clear whether a data file exists to 
estimate this differential.  
Fertility: In the proposed model, the probability of having a child will depend on the mother’s age, place of 
residence, immigrant status and length of residence, and education level. Base risk will be estimated using vital 
statistics and fertility differentials using the EU-LFS data and the own-children method. A birth doesn’t change 
the mother’s characteristics except its parity, and starts the simulation of a new case. The characteristics of  
the child are defined using information from the mother, but the characteristics of the child don’t have to  
be the same as the characteristics of the mother (i.e. there is a possibility of intergenerational changes in 
characteristics such as spoken language or religion). 
Internal migration: In the context of an European model, internal migration refers to moves between the EU-28 
countries. The EU-LFS is not a good source for estimating flows between countries because of sample size and 
under enumeration of non-natives, but will be used to estimate differentials in the probability of migrating 
using the information about the country of residence a year ago available in the EU-LFS. In a first step, the 
origin-destination total flows will be estimate using Bayesian method. Then, using the Rogers-Castro model, 
the total flows will be disaggregated by age. Differentials in outmigration probabilities will be estimated using 
logistic regressions and the EU-LFS. Regressors will include immigrant status, country of birth, education level, 
LF activity status, and length of time spent in the current country of residence and control for age and sex. In a 
final step, a country of destination will be attributed to each out-migrant according to his or her specific 
country of origin, age group, sex and education level using distribution matrices estimated from past observed 
trends.  
Education level: Transitions between four education levels (less than high school, high school graduate, more 
than high school but not graduated, and university graduate) will be estimated using logistic regressions and 
the EU-LFS data. The model will first attribute a highest education level (determined at birth or at t0 for those 
aged 0-24 in the base population) and then, for those with a high school level or more, determine the age at 
transition to higher education level. The relevant determinants will be sex, country of residence, education of 
mother, immigrant status, language spoken and religion. A cohort parameter will also be estimated to take into 
account the increasing educational attainment of younger cohorts.  
Labor force: EU-LFS data will be used to estimate the transitions between active and inactive and between 
employed and unemployed statuses by age, sex, region, immigrant status/country of origin and possibly some 
other characteristics. For those who are employed, we will also project the total number of hours worked.  
Emigration: Since migrations between EU countries are modeled as internal mobility, emigration refers to a 
move outside the EU-28. Probabilities of leaving the country (excluding internal moves) will be estimated using 
annual emigration rates by age, sex, and region from national population estimates. If possible, a parameter 
will take into account the higher risk for recent immigrants to leave the country, but at this point we don’t 
know whether a data source is available to realize that estimation. 
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Immigration: a predetermined number of immigrants from outside the EU-28 will be added into the projection 
model year by year. This number of immigrants and their characteristics will vary from one scenario to the 
other. The model will allow to specify the characteristics (age at arrival, sex, country of birth, education level, 
etc.) of new immigrants according to an observed distribution (for instance, taken from recent immigrants in 
the EU-LFS) or according to the findings generated in the analysis of the “push factors”. Once into the model, 
immigrants will be subject to the same events as the base population, but with their specific probabilities.  
Assumptions and scenarios 
Projection scenarios will be established according to specific sets of assumptions on both the general level of 
each phenomenon and the characteristic-specific differentials between individuals at risk of experiencing the 
event. For example, the model will allow for changes of total fertility level over time and of fertility differentials 
according to the woman’s characteristics.  
For immigration level and characteristics, specific scenarios will be established in the analytical part of part 3 of 
the research project (push factors). For the sake of this proposal, it is only important to state that scenarios and 
hypotheses will occur both at the macro and micro (individual) levels, and will permit changing behavior over 
the simulated life courses.  
One scenario will be designed so as to replicate the age and sex structure of the national population 
projections compiled by Eurostat (this scenario will not include any differential risks). This will be useful to both 
calibrate and validate the microsimulation model and to assure a projection scenario that will provide detailed 
characteristics of the population that will be coherent in terms of age and sex structure with the official 
national statistics. 
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3. Push factors: 
3.1 Human Capital projections to 2060 for all African and West-Asian countries following the 
SSP narratives  
Population, Migration and Environment: The long view 
The number of people inhabiting the earth has fluctuated significantly over the course of human history, in 
response to both natural changes in the environment and stresses to local habitats created by the populations 
themselves (FN: This section draws heavily on Chapter 12 of Lutz et al 2014). From the first appearance of 
Homo sapiens some 200,000 years ago in Africa until about 35,000 years ago, the world’s human population 
was well under one million, a number that meant the threat of extinction was always looming (Biraben 2003). 
Only after the Neolithic Revolution, which introduced agriculture, did the world population increase 
significantly, surpassing 100 million about 7000 years ago. But it was in the 19th century that population growth 
began to accelerate in what are now the world’s most industrialized countries. This rapid population increase 
as a consequence of declining death rates due to better nutrition and hygiene, more accessible fresh water 
supplies, and advances in preventive medicine. Immediately following World War II, death rates began a 
precipitous fall, due primarily to the development of antibiotics and other medical advances. For several 
decades following the war, birth rates remained very high (and in some cases increased due to the better 
health of women) because high fertility norms had been deeply imbedded in most traditional cultures and 
religions. Such norms tend to change only slowly, and as a consequence, the world population experienced a 
dramatic increase, from 2.5 billion in 1950 to more than seven billion today. 
Conventional population projections rarely make reference to the fact that all human life depends on 
functioning environmental life support systems. This “support system” aspect of human life was included in the 
expert questionnaire described in Chapters 2-7 of Lutz et al 2014, with some of the predefined arguments 
explicitly referring to the possible effects of environmental change on future trends in health, mortality, and 
migration.  
With a time horizon of up to 2050, the possible effects of environmental change on the population outlook are 
typically seen by the experts as having only marginal impacts. This may be due to the fact that the international 
population experts included in the survey were almost exclusively social scientists who rarely deal with 
environmental issues and consider social and economic factors as the key drivers in their analyzes. The slow 
progression of global climate change, at least on the scale of human measurement, is also a factor in the 
experts’ judgments. Another dampening factor on the rating of environmental change is that even the more 
dramatic climate change scenarios do not predict significant changes over the next few decades. The significant 
changes in sea level rise and regional temperature and precipitation patterns could potentially have serious 
implications for future health and migration patterns, but not until the second half of the century and beyond. 
This section will address the environmental change issue directly by analyzing the global population and human 
capital outlook for the rest of this century in a broader context of sustainable development and global 
environmental change. In doing so, we will consider both the effects of human population on the natural 
environment and the vulnerability of human populations to such possible future changes.  
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Figure 3: Chart depicting how the human population influences climate change and is in turn affected by the consequences of climate change 
(Source: (Wolfgang Lutz 2009c)). 
Figure 3 depicts how the interactions between population change and climate change can be conceptualized. It 
shows that the changing size and structure of human populations enter into our concerns about climate change 
at both the beginning and the end of the causal chain. Humans have been causing the emissions that trigger 
climate change. In turn, climate change sets in motion forces that can threaten humans’ well-being. In the  
past most research and policy focus has been on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, but more recently the 
emphasis has been shifting to strategies for strengthening adaptive capacities for coping with unavoidable 
climate change. This shift opens important new areas of analysis for demographers in all parts of the world. 
Although efforts to quantify the contribution of population changes to climate change have been outside  
the realm of demography and have proven difficult, efforts to address adaptive capacity by studying and 
forecasting differential vulnerability are well-suited to what the powerful demographic toolbox has to offer 
(Wolfgang Lutz 2009c). 
Climate change is of concern principally because it is dangerous to human well-being. The notion of 
“dangerous” has a specific importance with respect to climate change because the only globally binding 
agreement, the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, postulates in its core sentence to “avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system”. This convention has become the fundamental document 
supporting every international effort to combat or adapt to climate change. In principle, every assessment of 
the dangers associated with alternative emissions trajectories would have to anticipate the consequences of 
the resulting climate change on human well-being. This is impossible in practice because not enough is known 
about what changes will occur in the bio-physical conditions or how future populations will be able to cope 
with those changes. The European Union and the Copenhagen Climate Summit have defined a simple, clear 
goal in mitigating climate change: limiting the warming to not more than 2 °C in global mean temperature. This 
pragmatic definition of dangerous climate change, however, does not address the role of adaptation in 
moderating the impacts on human well-being. This path of causation is depicted on the right-hand side of the 
chart at the bottom of Figure 3. 
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On the left side of the chart, population is viewed as a driver of the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), 
which is in line with the conventional view: The I = PAT model (Ehrlich and Holdren 1971) tried to distinguish 
between the supposedly separate effects of population size (P), consumption associated with affluence (A), 
and technological efficiency (T). Recent analyzes have considered more complex effects and the possibility of 
interactions such as the model by O’Neill et al (2010), which includes the effects of changing household size, 
age structure, and urbanization on energy use. The findings show that population ageing and urbanization can 
have significant effects on total emissions with the magnitudes depending on the specific model definitions.  
In the same chart, the changing structure of the human population by age, sex, education, place of residence, 
and household size also appear as drivers of consumption levels. 
The right hand side of Figure 3 indicates that the human population is also being affected by climate change. 
People will likely be exposed to increasing hazards resulting from more frequent and intensive extreme events 
such as storms, floods, sea-level rise, and changing regional and temporal patterns of temperature and 
humidity. The temperature and humidity changes are expected to affect agricultural production and the spread 
of certain diseases. Whether and to what extent these hazards will result in human fatalities depends on the 
vulnerability of the people affected. That vulnerability is dependent on their strength and resiliency.  
Assessment of likely future vulnerability presents the biggest research gap for assessing the dangers associated 
with climate change and is difficult to conduct. Many published estimates of likely climate-induced fatalities, 
for instance calculations of additional malaria deaths due to climate change, assume that future climate 
conditions (e.g. in 2070) will affect populations that will continue into the future with similar socio-economic 
development and, as a result, have similar public health capabilities as they have today. As illustrated in other 
chapters of Lutz et al. 2014, however, societies are not stationary and will almost certainly be quite different 
from today. In particular, younger generations in almost all countries are on average better educated than the 
older ones, which will result in improvements in the average education of the future adult population. 
Economic growth and public health governance will also strengthen resilience. In addition to mortality and 
morbidity directly inflicted by such hazards, many of the expected consequences of climate change arise from 
climate-induced threats to traditional livelihoods. “Loss of livelihood” may constitute a push factor for 
migration or, in the worst case, lead to mortality – both demographic factors that change a population’s 
structure. 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, we not only know that societies change over time as a function of 
changing age, sex, education, and other structures, but we also have a unique tool kit (multi-state cohort 
component methods) to model and project those changing structures with relatively small uncertainties over 
several decades. Furthermore, demographers have long studied a wide variety of differentials, particularly 
differential vulnerability to threats such as infant mortality, adult mortality, morbidity, and disability. We can 
also study differentials in education and other empowerment factors that enhance the adaptive capacity of 
individuals, households, and communities. 
Defining the SSP scenarios 
The multi-state cohort component approach has substantial potential for studying climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.  Accordingly, the most recent international effort to develop a shared set of socio-economic 
scenarios included a more detailed population component than previous efforts. For more than a dozen years 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) modeling community has used a set of emissions 
scenarios as defined in Nakicenovic (2000) . While these SRES scenarios were very detailed on the energy, 
technology, and emissions side, they included only total population size and GDP per capita as indicators. 
Population was only used as a scaling variable.  
More recently the climate change research community began development of a new framework for the 
creation and use of scenarios to improve interdisciplinary analysis and assessment of climate change, its 
impacts, and response options (O’Neill et al. 2014) 
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This process, as formulated at an IPCC workshop in 2007, includes a set of forcing pathways, known as the 
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), to be combined with alternative socioeconomic development 
pathways (Moss et al. 2010). The development of RCPs has been completed and the pathways documented in a 
special issue of Climatic Change (Vuuren et al. 2011) . The development of the socioeconomic scenarios, known 
as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) was completed in late 2012. 
The SSPs were designed to include both a qualitative component in the form of a narrative on global 
development (see below), and a quantitative component that includes numerical pathways for certain variables 
(Arnell et al. 2011). Narratives were developed for basic versions of five SSPs, illustrated in Figure 3 with 
respect to socioeconomic challenges to mitigation and adaptation. 
 
This range of the SSPs is broad enough, in 
principle, to contain a large number of socioeconomic pathways that represent various combinations of 
challenges to mitigation and adaptation.
 
The SSPs as presented here are single pathways that are 
representative of the types of socioeconomic pathways that could occupy particular domains within the overall 
range. The following definitions of the narratives are based on O’Neill (O’Neill et al. 2014). In the following list, 
we present the overall storyline and then translate this general view of future global trends into specific 
assumptions for future fertility, mortality, migration, and education trends as they have been developed at 
IIASA in consultations with the global SSP community (see Table 1 below). Three groups of countries are 
considered: “High fertility countries” as defined by a Total Fertility Rate of more than 2.9 in 2005-2010; “Low 
fertility countries” including all countries with a Total Fertility Rate of 2.9 and below that are not included in 
the third category; “Rich-OECD countries”, defined by OECD membership and the World Bank category of high 
income countries. It is important to note that for this set of general SSPs, countries are assumed to stay in their 
initial grouping throughout the process. This may be unrealistic for countries that are, for example, in the midst 
of a fertility decline and may move soon into the low fertility group of countries. Because there are a seemingly 
infinite number of ways in which countries could change groupings, it was decided that this should be left to 
users who want to define their country-specific SSPs. 
Although the SSP process and the effort reported in the first eleven chapters of Lutz et al 2014 book were 
independent processes, they now have been merged in the sense that the Medium Scenario of the above 
described new populations projections is identical in every respect with the SSP2 as described below. Similarly, 
the different education scenarios and the high and low fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions used in 
the SSP scenarios are directly derived from the analysis presented in this book. In this way the SSP community 
can benefit from the scientific effort that produced this new set of projections. 
Figure 4: Location of five SSPs in space spanned by differing degrees of socio-economic challenges for adaptation and mitigation. 
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SSP 1: Sustainability 
This world is making relatively good progress toward sustainability, with ongoing efforts to achieve 
development goals while reducing resource intensity and fossil fuel dependency. Elements that contribute to 
this progress are a rapid development of low-income countries, a reduction of inequality (globally and within 
economies), rapid technology development, and a high level of awareness regarding environmental 
degradation. Rapid economic growth in low-income countries reduces the number of people below the poverty 
line. The world is characterized by an open, globalized economy, with rapid technological change directed 
toward environmentally friendly processes, including clean energy technologies and innovations that enhance 
agricultural output. Consumption is oriented toward low material growth and energy intensity, with a relatively 
low level of consumption of animal products. Significant investments in education coincide with low population 
growth, and both government and private institutions are working together to promote public policy solutions 
and economic development. The Millennium Development Goals are achieved within the next decade or two, 
resulting in educated populations with access to safe water, improved sanitation and medical care. Other 
factors that reduce vulnerability to climate and other global changes include the implementation of stringent 
policies to control air pollutants and rapid shifts toward universal access to clean and modern energy in the 
developing world. 
Population Component of SSP1:  
This storyline assumes that educational and health investments accelerate the demographic transition, leading 
to a relatively low world population. This implies assumptions of low mortality and high education for all three 
country groups. With respect to fertility assumptions the story is more complex. For rich OECD countries the 
emphasis on quality of life is assumed to make it easier for women to combine work and family, making further 
fertility declines unlikely. For this reason the medium fertility assumption is chosen for this group of countries. 
Low fertility assumptions are chosen for all other countries as implied by the assumed rapid continuation of 
demographic transition. Migration levels are assumed to be medium for all countries under this SSP. 
SSP2: Middle of the road – continuation of trends 
In this SSP2 world, trends typical of recent decades continue, with some progress toward achieving 
development goals, historic reductions in resource and energy intensity, and slowly decreasing fossil fuel 
dependency. Development of low-income countries proceeds unevenly, with some countries making relatively 
good progress while others are left behind. Most economies are politically stable with partially functioning  
and globally connected markets. A limited number of comparatively weak global institutions exist. Per-capita 
income levels grow at a medium pace on the global average, with slowly converging income levels between 
developing and industrialized countries. Intra-regional income distributions improve slightly with increasing 
national income, but disparities remain high in some regions. Educational investments are not high enough  
to rapidly slow population growth, particularly in low-income countries. Achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals at the country level is delayed by several decades, leaving populations without access  
to safe water, improved sanitation, or medical care. Similarly, there is only intermediate success in addressing 
air pollution and improving energy access for the poor. 
Population Component of SSP2: Medium 
This is the middle of the road scenario that that can also be seen as the most likely path for each country.  
It combines for all countries medium fertility with medium mortality, medium migration, and the Global 
Education Trend (GET) education scenario. This corresponds exactly to the medium scenario of the 
Wittgenstein Centre projections described in the previous chapters. 
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SSP 3: Fragmentation  
This narrative is an opposite of sustainability. The world is separated into regions characterized by extreme 
poverty, with pockets of moderate wealth. In the majority of countries, the struggle is to maintain living 
standards for rapidly growing populations. Regional blocks of countries have re-emerged with little 
coordination between them. This is a world failing to achieve global development goals and with little progress 
in reducing resource intensity and fossil fuel dependency. Environmental concerns such as air pollution are not 
being addressed. Countries in this scenario focus on achieving energy and food security goals within their own 
region. The world has de-globalized, and international trade, including energy resource and agricultural 
markets, is severely restricted. The lack of international cooperation combined with low investments in 
technology development and education slow down economic growth in high-, middle-, and low-income 
regions. Population growth in this scenario is high as a result of the education and economic trends, and the 
growth in urban areas in low-income countries is often in unplanned settlements. Unmitigated emissions are 
relatively high, driven by the high population growth, use of local energy resources, and slow technological 
change in the energy sector. Governance and institutions are weak and lack cooperation, consensus, or 
effective leadership. Investments in human capital are low and inequality is high. A regionalized world leads to 
reduced trade flows, and institutional development is unfavorable, leaving large numbers of people vulnerable 
to climate change because of their low adaptive capacity. Policies are oriented towards security, including 
barriers to trade. 
Population Component of SSP3: Stalled Development 
In demographic terms this is a world with a stalled demographic transition. Fertility is assumed to be low in the 
rich OECD countries and high in the other two country groups. Population growth is assumed to be high in 
developing countries and low in industrialized countries. Accordingly, this scenario assumes high mortality and 
low education for all three country groupings. Due to the emphasis on security and barriers to international 
exchange, migration is assumed to be low for all countries. 
SSP 4: Inequality  
This pathway envisions a highly unequal world, both within and across countries. A relatively small, rich global 
elite is responsible for much of the emissions, while a larger, poorer group contributes little to emissions and is 
vulnerable to impacts of climate change in both industrialized and developing countries. In this world, global 
energy corporations use investments in Research and Development as hedging strategy against potential 
resource scarcity or climate policy, developing and applying low-cost alternative technologies. Mitigation 
challenges are therefore low due to a combination of low reference emissions and/or high latent capacity to 
mitigate. Governance and globalization are effective for and controlled by the elite, but are ineffective for most 
of the population. Access to high quality education, health services, and family planning is also limited, leading 
to high population growth in low-income countries. Challenges to adaptation are high due to relatively low 
income and low human capital among the poorer population, and ineffective institutions. 
Population Component of SSP4: Inequality 
In order to best reflect the inequality in education, Lutz et al (2014) developed a special scenario that differs 
from the standard education scenarios used in the rest of the book in that it produces a more polarized 
education distribution in every country. There is a group with very high education levels (which is bigger in the 
rich OECD countries) and large groups with low education levels. In terms of fertility, the national averages 
imply continued high fertility in today’s high fertility countries and continued low fertility in both groups of low 
fertility countries. The high fertility countries are assumed to suffer from high levels of mortality, whereas the 
other two groups have medium mortality. Migration is assumed to be at the medium level for all countries. 
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SSP 5: Conventional development  
This storyline envisions a world that stresses conventional development oriented toward economic growth as 
the solution to social and economic problems through the pursuit of enlightened self-interest. The preference 
for rapid conventional development leads to an energy system dominated by fossil fuels, resulting in high GHG 
emissions and challenges to mitigation. Lower socio-environmental challenges to adaptation result from 
attainment of human development goals, robust economic growth, highly engineered infrastructure with 
redundancy to minimize disruptions from extreme events, and highly managed ecosystems. 
Population Component of SSP5: Conventional Development 
This world of conventional development features high education assumptions and low mortality assumptions 
across all countries. For fertility the pattern is strongly differentiated, with relatively high fertility assumed for 
the rich OECD countries (as a consequence of high technology and a very high standard of living that allows  
for easier combination of work and family, and possibly for immigrant domestic assistants) and low fertility 
assumed for all other countries. The emphasis on market solutions and globalization also implies the 
assumption of high migration for all countries. 
Table 1: Matrix with SSP definitions 
  
Country 
Groupings Fertility Mortality Migration Education 
SSP1 HiFert Low Low Medium High (FT-GET) 
Rapid 
Development LoFert Low Low Medium High (FT-GET) 
  Rich-OECD Medium Low Medium High (FT-GET) 
SSP2 HiFert Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET) 
Medium LoFert Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET) 
  Rich-OECD Medium Medium Medium Medium (GET) 
SSP3 HiFert High High Low Low (CER) 
Stalled 
Development LoFert High High Low Low (CER) 
  Rich-OECD Low High Low Low (CER) 
SSP4 HiFert High High Medium CER-10%/GET 
Inequality LoFert Low Medium Medium CER-10%/GET 
  Rich-OECD Low Medium Medium CER/CER-20% 
SSP5 HiFert Low Low High High (FT-GET) 
Conventional 
Development LoFert Low Low High High (FT-GET) 
  Rich-OECD High Low High High (FT-GET) 
 
Some of the education scenario choices presented in Table 1 for different SSPs are combinations of the above 
described stylized scenarios: FT-GET for SSP1 and SSP5 has been calculated for each country by taking the 
arithmetic mean of the education progression rates implied under the GET and FT scenarios. For SSP4 a more 
complex combination was chosen in order to reflect the increasing within-country inequality that this storyline 
implies: “CER-10%/GET” implies that the educational attainment progression ratio (EAPR) is further reduced by 
10 percent, as compared to CER (and hence still more pessimistic), for the transitions from no education to 
incomplete primary, incomplete primary to completed primary, and completed primary to completed lower 
secondary. The GET transition ratios are assumed for the higher educational categories, which will produce 
larger groups of elites in these countries. Under “CER/CER-20%”, for the high income OECD countries, it is 
assumed that for these higher education groups the transition rates are 20 percent lower than under CER and 
hence produce a more polarized society. 
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New Scenario Calculations 
Lutz et al (2014) presented results for all 5 SSPs for 195 countries of the world to 2100. The calculations 
supporting the scenarios resulted in an enormous number of data points. For every country and for every 
scenario, population and education pyramids were produced for every point in time (5-year steps) from 2010 
to 2100. The data result in 18 pyramids for each of the 195 countries (plus for six world regions and the world 
total), times five scenarios, plus a pyramid for the starting year. Each pyramid contains three age groups below 
age 15 and 18 age groups above age 15. The age groups are each sub-divided by sex and six different 
educational attainment categories. This entire exercise resulted in 3,939,390 data points, which are available 
online at: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb/. 
In the context of this JRC-IIASA project a new round of calculations based on more recent starting data will be 
performed. The empirical data base will be updated to include - wherever possible – the results of the 2010/11 
round of censuses as well as the most recent survey results. The work of the Centre of Expertise will focus on 
all African countries as well as countries of Eastern Europe and Asia that are considered potential sending 
countries of migrants to the EU. At IIASA/Wittgenstein Centre, in parallel, the work will be complemented by 
scenario calculations for all other countries of the world. Hence, the joint effort will result in an all new set of 
SSP scenarios for all countries of the world based on the most recently available data. These projections will 
become public domain and will be available for all other parts of the European Commission, in particular DG 
DevCo. 
A further difference to the previous IIASA/Wittgenstein Centre projections published in 2014 is that this new 
set of scenarios will include more alternative migration scenarios that will affect the population projection 
results of both sending and receiving countries. 
3.2 Examining how climate change influences drivers of migration 
Objectives 
1. Investigate the extent to which global environmental change influences drivers of outmigration  
2. Develop scenarios on migration influenced by climate change considering future changes interaction 
between migration drivers and climate change as a potential push factor 
Research context 
Estimating migration flows and patterns, both internal and international migration, is a challenging task owing 
to both the lack of data and discrepancies in the definition and measurement of migration data (Bell et al. 
2002; Willekens et al. 2016). Forecasting future migration flows thus is even more difficult not only because of 
the lack of data but also due to the complexity of migration process and high predictive uncertainty (Bijak and 
Wiśniowski 2010). Meanwhile, the alarm on climate change and its impacts resulted in attempts to predict 
climate-induced migration by many scholars and UN agencies (El-Hinnawi 1985; Myers 1993, 2002). While 
these studies are often popular among the media, they pretty much represent well-educated guesswork. 
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Apart from the complexity of climate science in assessing the future impact of climate change on societies, 
migration itself is a complex process driven by a diversity of drivers (e.g. social, economic, political, and 
environmental). To predict “migration influenced by climate change” (Black et al 2011a: 34) hence also requires 
predicting how other drivers of migration will change over time. In fact, the experts of migration are often very 
reluctant to quantify and to map out migration patterns (Black et al. 2011a). The studies in this field are often 
split into two broad categories. On the one hand, the micro-level approaches or local or regional case studies 
seek to understand the phenomenon of migration in a specific context, spatio-temporally delineated (Jónsson 
2010). On the other hand, global approaches attempt to propose some generic models which sum up into a 
conceptual framework of the main drivers of migration from which estimates of current migration flows and 
assumptions on how these flows and patterns could evolve in the future are sometimes made (The Foresight 
project (Black et al. 2011b) is a prime example). In-between, there are a huge range of works which linked the 
advantages and challenges of both approaches. Following a hypothetical-deductive approach, the empirical 
case studies at local or subnational levels are often used to understand macro-level trends and draw the 
assumptions necessary to the elaboration of generic models. In all cases, the question mark remains the same: 
How can we forecast migration under high uncertainties related to the nature of the migration process which is 
highly complex, dynamic and context-dependent?  
Furthermore, limited data availability needed to quantify migration influenced by climate change raises some 
additional challenges which put further uncertainties in migration forecasting models (McLeman 2013). In the 
past, a wide array of methods have been used for migration forecasting, with the central focus frequently on 
one or more of the following: extrapolation of the past data, expert judgement like the opinion of experts in 
the field, the inclusion of additional explanatory information such as economic data and demographic 
characteristics or life histories and qualitative scenarios, e.g. based on consideration of transnational social 
spaces (Haas et al. 2010).   
The major concern with extrapolation of the past data is the lack of consideration of new drivers. In a context 
where climate change is expected to exacerbate the impacts of natural hazards and lead to more frequent 
climate extreme events (IPCC 2014), strong environmental drivers could provoke new patterns of migration 
and push population to react differently and reconsider their mobility pattern, even in regions which are 
currently not strongly concerned by emigration. 
Approach and methods  
To overcome the static problem posed by the conventional method of extrapolating past or current trends,  
we employ migration scenarios approach to account for macro-structural changes and complex interactions 
between social, economic, political and environment drivers. While migration scenarios themselves are not 
forecasts but are ‘stories about possible futures for migration’  (de Haas 2011, p. S60), building upon empirical 
data of selected case studies, we aim to quantify and forecast migration flows influenced by climate change 
based on the scenarios developed. 
The scenario approach allows us to imagine plausible futures which may include the components of what we 
do not know yet. For instance, future climate change and its impacts are considered through a range of 
scenarios e.g., Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) and aligned to them, the Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways (SSPs) aim to analyze the feedbacks between climate change and socioeconomic factors such as 
population dynamics, economic development and technological progress. We can then describe migration in a 
changing world, where some components of these changes are captured by the SSPs and RCPs scenarios as 
presented  
in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Combination between SSPs and RCPs: Scenario matrix architecture 
 
Based on the interactions of the RCPs and SSPs scenarios which provide future scenarios for climate and 
socioeconomic systems, we aim to derive three possible migration scenarios: Low, Medium and High. This 
migration pressure does not necessarily translate into actually higher migration because e.g. under SSP3 the 
narrative assumes a tendency towards regional segregation and stronger attempts to close borders.  
It is nevertheless not an easy task to develop scenarios for migration influenced by climate change and quantify 
migration given the high complexity of migration process and decisions. To develop scenarios for migration 
influenced by climate change, we have to identify lines of action, inflexions, underline the convergences, 
including the wide range of divergences between the regional and national drivers of migrations in the current 
countries of emigration to Europe according to the scenarios of climate change (RCPs) and the expected range 
of socio-economical pathways (SSPs) in the future. Figure 6 presents the workflow for the development of 
scenarios for migration influenced by climate change over the project period. 
Figure 5: Workflow for the development of migration scenarios. 
  SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5 
RCP2.6           
RCP4.5           
RCP8.5           
Phase1
• Literature review of migration research frameworks, 
scenarios and modelling
• Meta-analysis of environmental/climate drivers of migration
Phase 2
• Develop narratives for migration scenarios
• Case studies
Phase 3
• Quantify migration flows in selected countries considering 
different drivers
• Develop migration model
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Phase 1 
1.1 Research framework 
Definition of key terms (which type of migration/spatio-temporal frame) and state-of-the-art insights from 
existing migration theories. This framework will capture how broader processes of regional and global social, 
economic, cultural and political change have affected migration patterns and trends. Reviewing of methods 
used in the aim of building scenarios could be done as well (out of the migration communities, the CCA and 
DDR communities could be source of inspiration for method which could be adapted and apply to migration). 
1.2 Building a conceptual and systemic model 
Qualitative systemic model – Inspired from the systems theory, a systemic approach has the objective to 
understand the nonlinear behavior of complex systems over conceptual frames which includes the elements in 
the system under study, as well as their interaction and interdependence. A qualitative systemic model is a 
scientific reasoning tool for gaining a better understanding of the system elements (drivers for instance), their 
relations and interactions, and thus allowing for anticipating dynamics of complex systems without necessary 
providing a quantification. 
 - Conceptualization of the migration process from the drivers to the consequences and feedback loops)  
→ Pre-step to collect the required materials for the construction of the conceptual framework as a basis for  
the scenarios.  
a. Systematic review of case studies  
b. Drivers, assumptions, spatio-temporal scale, diversity of migrant profile: - building a generic 
conceptual model and then adapting to subgroups (e.g. women, …)  
c. Conceptual framework vs contextual uncertainties: awareness on the limits of the models  
d. Expert discussion on the conceptual framework: validation, critic on the representation of the complex 
migration process/ the series of impact chains 
1.3 Meta-analysis of environmental/climate drivers of migration 
Despite an increase in scholarly and policy interests in the impacts of climate change on migration, empirical 
knowledge in the field remains varied, patchy and limited (Hunter et al. 2015; Piguet et al. 2011). Only recently 
in the past couple of years, thanks to the increase in data availability – both migration and climate data – and 
improvement in computation methods and technology, we observed a sharp increase in empirical studies on 
climate-induced migration. Most studies on migration influenced by climate change/ environmental change, 
however, have been carried out in a localized context. Hence, it is not possible to generalize the findings 
beyond the particular country analyzed. Following the study of Hsiang et al. (2013) on quantifying the effect of 
climate on conflict, we aim to perform a meta-analysis of empirical literature on climate/environmental drivers 
of migration. This would enable us to assess the extent to which climate factors influence migration. 
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Phase 2 
2.1 Case studies 
Countries in Africa will be selected for case studies. To account for the complexity of migration system, the 
countries selected share similarities in certain drivers e.g., demographic and economic factors but may differ in 
terms of climate factors. In this exercise, we analyze migration trends and patterns based on real migration and 
climate data.  
2.2 Development of narratives for migration scenarios 
Based on the review of migration framework and models and meta-analysis in Year 1 and the empirical analysis 
of the selected case studies, narratives for migration scenarios are developed.  We aim to achieve sound 
narratives for low, medium and high migration scenarios. 
Phase 3 
3.1 Quantifying migration flows 
Based on the migration scenarios developed, migration flows from selected countries are quantified.  
The estimated migration flows will be validated against the actual data. 
3.2 Development of migration model  
Ultimately, we plan to develop a migration model where it is possible to forecast migration based on changing 
different parameters (drivers of migration) in the model. 
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4. Combining all factors in the definition of alternative migration scenarios to 
Europe 
Taking into consideration the results of all the studies described above, in a last step of the project alternative 
scenarios for possible future migration streams into the EU by age, sex, education and labor force participation 
with will be defined.  These scenarios will be defined on different narratives about the pull and push factors as 
well as the “intervening obstacles” in the form of migration cost and different policies.  
The precise way in which these actual migration scenarios will be discussed and defined is still unclear at this 
point because this will require extensive consultations within JRC and other parts of the Commission as well as 
with the international scientific advisory committee. The default base line will be the assumption of a 
continuation of bi-lateral migration flows as they have already been estimated by age and sex by Guy Abel and 
others (of the Wittgenstein Centre) for the period 2010-15 and will still be estimated by level of education over 
the coming year. Since this component is only scheduled for the second half of 2018 there still is time to 
further elaborate this strategy. 
The final choice of migration scenarios will be guided by the general framework of the different SSP narratives 
as described above. This will also take into account different possible migration channels and mechanisms such 
as past migration experiences, linguistic, historical, and geographic aspects. These alternative scenarios will be 
combined with intra-EU demography and labor market data (i.e. ageing, social cohesion and labor market key 
indicators and changes) to foresee possible impact of migration into EU society and possible political reactions 
and feed-back mechanisms on the migration flows themselves. 
In a last step the finalized migration scenarios will then again be applied to both the macro- and micro-
simulation models for all EU member states including all the social and economic characteristics of people as 
described above. This will then serve as input to the scientific and political discussion about the economic and 
social consequences of alternative possible migration patterns in the context of population ageing. 
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5. Work Plan 
The following table presents the milestones and main tasks of the project to be realized as well as their time 
schedule. The project has a duration of three years from June 2016 to June 2019. Milestones refer in part to 
important stages of the work process and in part to important deadlines that have to be met to assure that the 
researches realized by the CEPAM team could influence the future immigration and integration policies of the 
next European Commission (2019-2024). In this context, the main milestone is December 2018 when the final 
draft of the book to be written, including policy recommendations and an executive summary, has to be 
completed.  
The first stage of the project is devoted to recruitment of the scientists who will work on the project and the 
development of the methodology and work plan. In the next main stage of the project, most of the efforts will 
be dedicated to: 1) estimating the parameters driving the main components of population changes in Europe, 
2) analyzing push and pull factors that influence migration flows from non-European countries to Europe in 
order to develop alternative scenarios, and 3) writing the code of the computer programs for both the macro 
and micro models of population projections. These tasks will be accomplished in parallel and will be completed 
by February 2018, another important milestone of the project, when the analysis of push and pull factors 
should be completed so alternative scenarios can be created to feed into the projection models.   
Spring of 2018 will be dedicated to implementation of these scenarios, validation of the results and preliminary 
analysis. The summer and the fall of 2018 will be consecrated to deeper analysis and writing of book chapters.  
After December 2018, the current plan is to continue the dissemination of the research program results in 
academic journals and to develop country specific microsimulation models that can take into account 
additional characteristics of the immigrant population not available in the annual EU-LFS survey. An example of 
such endeavor is the analysis of the second generation of immigrants using data from ad hoc module of the EU-
LFS survey. 
Although the dissemination of the results will be more intensive at the end of the project, scientific papers will 
be produced in all stages of it. For example, conference communications and scientific papers on the analysis 
of push and pull factors or on the estimation of the determinants of different transitions that will feed into the 
microsimulation model can be produced and submitted before the completion of the book. Accordingly,  
the time schedule also allocates some time work dedicated to preparation of scientific conferences: the 
International Microsimulation Association (IMA), the conference of the International Union for the Scientific 
Studies of Population (IUSSP), the European Population Conference and the Population Association of America 
(PAA). 
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